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Evidentiary Considerations in Civil Cases 
Maryland Judicial Institute 
March 17, 2000 
Lynn McLain 
Character Evidence 
A. General Rule of Inadmissibility 
5-404(a) (1st clause) 
& 
Character evidence is inadmissible to prove propensity --
that a person acted in conformity 
5-404(b) (1st clause): with his or her character on a particular occasion. 
B. When Admissible 
I. For impeachment (to show likelihood to lie), 
proof of character traits for truthfulness 
and veracity, of any witness who has testified 
(f.-404(a)(3)) and rehabilitation of witness 
who has been impeached by certain methods 
2. As substantive proof for purpose 
other than proving propensity 
a. 
b. 
Civil and criminal cases by 
either party when character is 
directly in issue ("essential 
element of charge, claim, or 
defense") (5-405(b)) (very rare, e.g., 
defamation, when truth is a defense) 
Proof of other crimes or acts to 
show only motive, etc. (5-404(b )); 
or acts by or reputation of victim, 
if known to D, to show D's 
state of mind. (This other purpose 
must be relevant to the case; don't 
lose sight of 5-401 and 5-403.) 
3. As substantive proof of propensity to 
act in conformity with character and 






a. In criminal cases, D may choose to Yes 
put hislher character in issue as 
circumstantial proof of innocence 
(then prosecution can rebut) (5-404( a)(l)) 
b. Character of victim where D Yes 
claims self-defense (see 5-404(a)(2)) 
c. Note: HABIT evidence is admissible under Rule 5-406. 






Only on cross of 
character witness 
('-405(a)) (But see also 
Rules 5-608 and 5-609). 
Yes 
Yes 
Only on cross of 
character witness 
(5-405(a)) 
Only on cross of character 
witness (5-405(a)) (but see 
2.b. above) 
d.· Note special rules for persons alleging sexual assault (5-412) and, in federal court, for persons 
sued for or charged with sexual assault (FRE 413-415) 
I. Character Evidence (for the text of the referenced rules, see infra pp. 12-16) 
A. Admissible either as substantive evidence (Rules 5-404 through 5-406) or only 
as to credibility (impeachment or rehabilitation, Rules 5-608, 5-609, and 5-616). 
B. "The propensity rule" and its exceptions. 
1. "The propensity rule" generally excludes evidence of a person's other acts 
or a person's character or character trait to show that the person acted "in 
character" on the occasion at issue in the case. Rule 5-404(a)(1) and (b). 
EXAMPLE: Plaintiff sues for severe injuries she alleges were caused by 
defendant's driving his truck through a red light. 
a. Evidence that the plaintiffor the defendant is generally a bad driver 
is offered to show that the plaintiff or the defendant drove badly 
this time. Ruling: _______ _ 
b. Evidence that either one has driven through other red lights at other 
times is offered. Ruling: ________ _ 
[But, as to criminal cases, see Sessoms v. State, _ Md. _ (Sept. Term, 
1999, No. 68, Jan. 11,2000) where the Court of Appeals reversed the trial 
court's exclusion of evidence that the rape prosecutrix's brother was 
accused of robbing a third party hours after the alleged rape. Judge 
Cathell, writing for the court, stated: 
We hold that the test for admitting other crimes evidence in 
criminal proceedings enunciated in Faulkner generally does not apply 
to crimes, wrongs, or acts committed by someone other than a criminal 
defendant. * * * Because this rule is premised upon protecting an 
accused from undue prejudice, it does not apply to exclude other 
crimes evidence involving alleged actions by others testifying in the 
criminal proceedings. This is especially so when the evidence is 
crucial to the defense in a criminal proceeding and concerns 
impeachment of a witness with a possible prejudice, bias, interest, or 
motive to falsely testify. 
Judge Wilner, dissenting, joined by Judges Rodowsky and Raker, would 
have affirmed the trial judge's decision as an appropriate exercise of 
discretion under Rule 5-403. The brother already had been impeached by 
his prior convictions for robbery, including one the day after the alleged 
rape. 
2. Exceptions to the propensity rule are carved out in several Rules. 
a. Evidence of repeated, similar acts that are specific enough to 
constitute an individual's habit or a business or other organization's 
routine practice is admissible as substantive evidence to prove that 
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" .. 
the person or organization acted in accordance with that routine on 
the occasion in question anrial. Rule 5-406. 
EXAMPLE: Plaintiffs husband's testimony that he has been her passenger 
many times and she always buckles her seat belt before starting her car 
engine is offered to show that she buckled it on the day of the accident in 
question. Ruling: 
b. Limited exceptions in criminal cases only, regarding reputation or 
opinion evidence of the accused's or the victim's pertinent character 
trait, as substantive evidence. Rule 5-404(a)(l)(A) and (B) and 
(2). 
c. Exceptions for impeachment: evidence of a person's prior 
convictions (Rule 5-609), prior bad acts not resulting in conviction 
(Rule 5-608(b)) and opinion or reputation evidence regarding that 
person's bad character trait for truthfulness and veracity (Rule 5-
608(a)(1) & (3)(A)), are admissible to prove that the person-
either a witness (Rule 5-404(a)(1)(C)) or a hearsay declarant (see 
Rule 5-806) - acted "in character" and lied in the testimony or 
statement admitted into evidence at trial. Rule 5-616(a)(6) and 
(b)(5) & (6). 
EXAMPLE: Plaintiff testified to the accident and to her injuries. 
1. May she be cross-examined about her 1995 conviction for 
grand larceny? Ruling: ________ _ 
11. About her having been fired for stealing from her 
employer? Ruling: ________ _ 
111. May the defense call a character witness to testify to the 
plaintiffs bad reputation for truthfulness, or to the witness's 
opinion that the plaintiff is generally a liar? Ruling: 
IV. May the character witness testify as to whether he or she 
believes the plaintiffs testimony in the case to be truthful? 
Ruling: 
d. Exception for rehabilitation: a witness whose credibility has been 
impeached in such a way as to constitute an attack on the witness's 
character for truthfulness (usually one or more of the three methods 
in c. above, but the trial judge may find that, ~, a particular 
impeachment by a prior inconsistent statement amounted to such 
an attack) may be rehabilitated by reputation or opinion evidence 
as to the witness's good character trait for truthfulness and veracity. 
Rules 5-608(a)(2) and (3)(A), 5-404(a)(1)(C), and 5-616(c)(3). 
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EXAMPLE: After the impeachment in c.i., ii., or iii. above, may plaintiff 
call a character witness who will testify to plaintiffs good reputation for 
truthfulness, or that, in the character witness's opinion, the plaintiff is 
generally a truthful person? Ruling: ______ _ 
C. Admission of character evidence to prove something other than propensity. 
1. Specific prior instances to show motive, opportunity, intent, common 
scheme or plan, preparation, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident with regard to the act at issue at trial. Rule 5-404(b). 
EXAMPLE a: May plaintiff prove that the defendant had just robbed a 
bank and was fleeing from the scene, to show why he would be likely to 
run a red light? Ruling: 
EXAMPLE b: If plaintiff alleges that defendant purposely ran into her, 
may plaintifftestify that she had recently reported him to their employer 
for sexual harassment? Ruling: 
2. Reputation testimony, opinion testimony, or evidence of specific instances, 
to prove a person's character or character trait when it is an "essential 
element of a [criminal] charge, [civil] claim, or defense .... " Rule 5-
405(b). Specific instances are allowed because someone's character must 
be proven, as an element. Therefore, the most probative - and the most 
time-consuming - method of proof is permitted. 
EXAMPLE a: Plaintiff alleges that Defendant-Parent negligently 
entrusted the family truck to Driver-Teenager. May Plaintiff prove 
reputation of Teenager as a bad driver, and/or specific instances of 
Teenager's prior reckless driving, known to Defendant-Parent? 
Ruling: ________ _ 
EXAMPLE b: Plaintiff sues Defendant for slander for telling Plaintiffs 
prospective landlord that Plaintiff was a "druggie." Defendant defends by 
alleging truth. May Defendant offer: 
(i) Reputation and opinion testimony that Plaintiff abuses 
drugs? Ruling: 
(ii) Evidence of specific instances of Plaintiffs using illegal 
drugs? Ruling: 
D. Methods of proof when "character witnesses" testify (in civil or criminal 
cases, as to a principal witness's truthfulness and veracity, under Rule 5-608(a); 
and, in criminal cases, under Rule 5-404(a)(1)(A) and (B)). 
1. Direct examination: reputation or opinion testimony, but not specific 
instances. Rules 5-405(a) and 608(a)(1), (2), and (3), 
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'. 
2. Cross-examination: character witness may be asked about knowledge of 
specific instances of the principal witness's conduct that would lead to a 
reputation or opinion different than that to which the character witness 
testified. Rules 5-405(a) and 5-608(a)(4). 
EXAMPLE: Assume that the Plaintiff has testified and is being 
impeached by a character witness. 
a. Direct examination of reputation witness: proponent establishes 
that the character witness and the Plaintiff are members of the 
same community (residential, work, school, etc.); that Plaintiff has 
a reputation in that community as to character for truthfulness; and 
that that reputation is bad. 
b. Direct examination of opinion witness: proponent establishes that 
the character witness has a "reasonable basis" for having an 
opinion regarding Plaintiffs character for truthfulness, ~, (at 
least from July 1, 1994, until the Court of Appeals' August 31, 
1999 decision in Jensen v. State) "I've worked next to her on the 
assembly line for 5Yz years. We take our lunch and cigarette breaks 
together." "In my opinion, she is not a truthful person." Compare, 
~, Durkin v. State, 284 Md. 445,453,397 A.2d 600 (1979) 
(police officer who had brief encounter with witness when witness 
had made larceny report, which officer concluded was false, lacked 
sufficient basis for his opinion as to witness's truthfulness to be 
admissible) with Barnes v. State, 57 Md. App. 50,57-60,468 A.2d 
1040 (1984 ) (character witness had adequate basis for opinion 
when she had known individual well for last two years, had been 
acquainted with her for several years before that, and had 
interviewed her several times to verify addresses and confirm 
leads). But see d.-f. infra. 
c. Cross-examination of either, as to specific instances inconsistent 
with the accuracy of the reputation or the opinion,~, "Did you 
know (or have you heard) that in Plaintiffs night school class the 
professor made an arithmetical error in Plaintiffs favor, and 
Plaintiff voluntarily came forward to tell the professor so that the 
professor could lower her grade?" The questioner may not provide 
extrinsic evidence of this specific instance, which is admissible 
only for the limited pUI]OSe of impeaching the character witness's 
testimony. 
d. Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 9-115, adopted in 1971, 
permits opinion testimony by a character witness "who has an 
adequate basis for forming an opinion as to another person's 
character." Before the adoption of Title 5, Hemingway v. State, 76 
Md. App. 127,543 A.2d 879 (1988), had found reversible error 
when a trial judge restricted a defense character witness to 
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testifying only to "the length of time he had known [the homicide 
victim] and his bald conclusion as to [the victim's] reputation for 
violence." 
Judge Karwacki, writing for the Court of Special Appeals 
and relying on language by Chief Judge Gilbert in a 1975 case, 
held that the trial judge should have permitted the defense to elicit 
from its witness the specific matters on which the witness based his 
opinion, first, so as to "convince the trial judge that the witness 
possesses an adequate basis for forming an opinion as to another 
person's character." 76 Md. App. At 134. Secondly, Hemingway 
held that the jury also should hear this evidence: 
This does not mean, however, that the basis for the character witness's 
opinion, if admitted, has no relevance to the weight ascribed to that 
opinion by the jury. Clearly, the bald conclusion of the witness without 
any reason to support it hardly commends the opinion for serious 
consideration by the trier of the fact. 
Id. at 135. 
Thus, Hemingway mandated the courts' permitting the 
character witness to state what it was that led him or her to form 
the opinion to which the witness wished to testify. 
e. Hemingway v. State was overruled by Title 5, in an effort to keep 
the direct testimony of a character witness short and sweet, i.e., to 
limit it to reputation or opinion. 
It was believed undesirable to open up side issues as to 
whether specific instances that led the character witness to form an 
opinion occurred or not -- particularly when the character evidence 
is tangential, anyway. (The Rules permit specific instances to be 
proved on direct when character is an "essential element of a 
charge, claim, or defense." See C.2. supra, p. 4.) 
Indeed, if one could testify to the specific instances that led 
to one's opinion, the opinion testimony would be superfluous and 
inadmissible under Rule 5-701, as unhelpful to the jury. 
FRE 608 is rather obtusely written. Md. Rule 5-608 was 
re-written in an effort to clarify, but not depart substantively from 
FRE 608 (except that the Md. Rule rej ects one federal case [as well 
as two 19th century Maryland cases] that permits character 
witnesses to testify to whether they believe the other witness's trial 
testimony). 
For example, Md. Rule 5-608(a)(3)(B) explicitly states that 
the character witness on direct "may give a reasonable basis for 
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testimony as to reputation or an opinion ... , but may not testify as 
to specific acts of truthfulness or untruthfulness .... " This is 
declarative of the federal case law construing the federal rule. 
The Federal Rule advisory committee's note provides that opinion 
testimony ought in general to "be confmed to the nature and extent of 
observation and acquaintance upon which the opinion is based." Fed. 
R. Evid. 405 advisory committee's note. The Maryland Reporter's 
Note provides that "[t]he Committee envisions 'reasonable basis' 
evidence as covering such matters as how long the witnesses have been 
acquainted, under what circumstances, etc." 
Jensen v. State, 355 Md. 692, 708 n.6, 736 A.2d 307 (1999). The 
"etc.," though meant to refer to matters of the same type as those 
listed, has caused problems, in that it has been expansively 
construed. See id. (f. infra). 
f. But Jensen, 355 Md. 692 (1999), has blurred the line. There the 
Court of Appeals (over a dissent on this point by Judge Chasanow) 
found that the trial court had erred in not permitting a defense 
character witness to explain, in front of the jury, that the reason she 
was of the opinion that one of the defendant's cohorts, a key 
State's witness, was a "compulsive liar," was because he told her 
"inconsistent stories about different things." 
The trial judge had permitted her to testify before the jury 
to how long she had known the State's witness and how often she 
spoke with him.' It heard her testimony about "inconsistent 
'The character witness, Melissa Goff, a tenth-grader, testified on direct: 
DEFENSE ATI'Y: Could you telI the jury, if you know, if you're familiar with Brian Wooldridge? 
GOFF: Yes, I am. 
Q: Okay, and how are you familiar with Brian Wooldridge? 
A: I've known him for a while. 
Q: You say a while? 
A: I guess about a year, even a little longer. 
Q: Now, is this a year before this incident or a year up to now? 
A: I guess a year before. 
Q: And during that particular year, how many times did you meet in a week? 
A: I guess once a week. 
* * * * * * * 
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stories" outside the hearing of the jury, 2 before pelTI1itting her to 
Q: Have you ever spoken to Mr. Wooldridge on the phone? 
A: Yes, I have. 
Q: And how many times have you spoken with him on the phone? 
A: I usually speak to him every day. 
Q: Okay, and when was that? 
A: While he was out of school. 
Q: And when was that? 
A: I don't remember the exact months. 
Q: And for what period of time did you speak to him every day-a week, two weeks, a month? 
A: I guess for about a month. Yeah, a month. 
Q: Okay, and do you have an opinion as to his veracity to tell the truth? 
STATE'S ATTORNEY: Objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sustained. Come forward, please, counsel. (Bench conference.) 
STATE'S ATTORNEY: Insufficient, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Here's what I'm going to do. I am going to excuse the jury, and I am going to conduct 
-have counsel conduct an examination out of the presence of the jury. I don't believe at this stage you've 
yet established that basis for her opinion, all right? Thank you. 
******* 
(The jury was excused from the courtroom.) 
355 Md. at 695-96. 
2THE COURT: Now, I sustained that objection on the basis that I conclude at this point there's not been 
an adequate basis for that opinion to be given, but ... I'll give you the opportunity at least to attempt to 
establish that basis while we're out of the presence of the jury. 
******* 
DEFENSE A TT'Y: In general, what would you talk about on the phone during that year that you knew 
him? 
******* 
A: Just things, but he liked to talk about-I guess regular things that kids or normal teenagers would talk 
about to each other. 
Q: Would he tell you inconsistent stories about different things? 
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testify to her opinion in front of the jury.3 
A: Yes. 
Q: Objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
["A lot of the stories that he told me didn't add up, saying that-one day he would tell me 
something that happened on that day and then a couple of days later he would tell me something else that 
had happened on that day that wouldn't have been able to happen if what he said before was true." Goff 
added that this happened "repeatedly." Jensen v. State, Md. App., Sept. Term, 1997, No. 1768, at 14 
(umeported), rev'd, 355 Md. 692). 
* * * * * * * 
THE COURT: Under the circumstances, it seems to me that testimony given by Ms. Goff supports a basis 
from the information for her perception of these conversations for giving evidence as to the truthfulness or 
not ofMr. Wooldridge, and I'm going to allow this course of examination to continue. 
******* 
(The jury returned to the courtroom). 
355 Md. at 697. 
3DEFENSE A TT'Y: Do you have an opinion about Mr. Wooldridge's veracity to tell the truth? 
A: Yes, urn-
Q: What is that opinion? 
A: I think that he's a compulsive liar. 
Q: What do you base that opinion on? 
STATE'S ATT'Y: Objection. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
355 Md. at 697. 
At the bench, the State argued that the defense had already laid the foundation and elicited the 
desired opinion, adding: "It's our position that those are specific instances (inaudible). He's done what 
he's been allowed to do under the rules, and that is (inaudible) opinion, and I don't think he should be 
allowed to go any further." In response, defense counsel claimed that "telling stories over and over again" 
was "not a specific act, that's an opinion." The trial court noted that Rule 5-608(a)(3)(B) prohibits a 
character witness from testifying about specific instances of truthfulness or untruthfulness and reasoned 
that any response would be "sort of a continuum of events ... no more than a number of specific events 
tied together, which I think will create the same mischief as is intended to be prevented by the rule .... " 
When defense counsel asserted that "the jury has a right to know what the basis is," the court declared, 
"No, I don't think that's it at all. I think you've gotten out of this witness on the subject what the rule 
intends for you to be able to get." 
Md. App. opinion at 15. 
-9-
In the majority opinion authored by Judge Raker, the Court 
held that the procedure waS an erroneous abuse of discretion. 4 It 
rejected the State's argument that "reasonable basis evidence 
properly is limited to how long and under what circumstances the 
witnesses have been acquainted." 355 Md. at 696. 5 The majority 
characterized the excluded evidence as "not evidence of 'specific 
instances, '" id. at 700, which it said would not be permitted on 
direct. 
4The majority found the error to be harmless, in light of overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt. 
Chief Judge Bell, joined by Judge Eldridge, dissented, on the ground that the error was so serious as to be 
reversible. 
5 Judge Chasanow, concurring and dissenting, concluded, on the other hand: 
It is quite clear that [Md. Rule 5-608(a)(3)(B)] is intended to allow the character witness to express the 
reasonable basis for arriving at an opinion, not the reasonable basis for the opinion arrived at. 
* * * 
In order for a character witness to testify about the untruthful character or bad reputation for 
truthfulness of another witness, the character witness should establish a basis of knowledge. * * * 
In the instant case, the testimony at issue was that "[a] lot of the stories that he told me didn't add 
up" and "one day he would tell me something that happened on that day and then a couple days later he 
would tell me something [absolutely inconsistent with the fIrst version)." This testimony is far more 
analogous to the prohibited specifIc acts of untruthfulness than to the permissible basis for knowledge of 
the witness's character. I do not believe the trial judge abused his discretion in prohibiting this testimony. 
355 Md. at 722, 724-26 (emphasis added). 
The Court of Special Appeals similarly reasoned: 
As we previously indicated, the substance of Goff s testimony in chambers was that Wooldridge 
"repeatedly" told her things that turned out to be untrue. From appellant's perspective, this amounted to a 
general statement about Wooldridge's character. From the trial court's perspective, however, Goffs 
testimony concerned a pattern of conduct that was predicated on numerous specifIc occurrences. Because 
Rule 5-608 permits, but does not mandate, introduction of evidence about the basis of the witness's belief, 
the trial court properly weighed the value of Goffs testimony in establishing how she formed her opinion 
against the danger that the jury would interpret her testimony as merely a summary of instances of 
dishonesty, introduced in lieu of a detailed description of each instance. 
It is clear from the record that the trial court was persuaded that the jury would perceive Goffs 
testimony as a "continuum" of specifIc events. Nonetheless, the court permitted the witness to tell the jury 
about the extent of her contact with appellant over a period of time. This testimony, if believed, indicated 
that Goffs testimony was not a "bald conclusion" .... Indeed, Goffs description of how long, and under 
what circumstances, she had known Wooldridge provided the jury with an ample basis to evaluate her 
opinion. Therefore, we perceive no abuse of discretion .... 
Md. App. opinion at 19. 
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The majority acknowledged that "Rule 5-608 
unquestionably intended to modify Maryland law, in particular, 
Hemingway v. State, 76 Md. App. 127,543 A.2d 879 (1988), to 
the extent that specific instances of truthfulness or untruthfulness 
were not admissible on direct examination of a witness." 355 Md. 
at 706. As the majority aptly explained: 
Maryland's Rule 608(a)(3)(B) is based on Federal Rule of Evidence 
608(b), which in tum is related to Federal Rule of Evidence 405(b) on 
specific instances evidence. The advisory committee's note to Federal 
Rule 405 explains that although specific instances are the most 
convincing character evidence, that type of evidence also "possesses 
the greatest capacity to arouse prejudice, to confuse, to surprise, and to 
consume time." See also COURT OF ApPEALS OF MARYLAND STANDfNG 
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, PROPOSED TITLE 
5 OF THE MARYLAND RULES OF PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5-608 
Reporter's Note (Subcommittee Draft 1991) (on file with Committee) 
(explaining that "routinely permitting such proof would distract and 
unduly influence juries and create too many time-consuming side 
issues."). As these notes suggest, once a witness testifies to a specific 
instance, the jury's focus necessarily turns to whether in fact that 
particular event occurred and the circumstances surrounding that event. 
Id. at 699-700 (emphasis added). Yet the majority concluded: 
In contrast, because [the character witness's] statement that [the State's 
witness] often told her mutually inconsistent stories spoke to a general 
trait and not to particular occasions on which he lied, it would not serve 
to distract and confuse the jury, nor would it consume time by altering 
the focus of the trial to other particular events. 
Id. at 700. 
Quaere as to what happens, under this ruling, to the scope 
of cross? Must not the opposing counsel be permitted to probe into 
the specific "inconsistent stories," if counsel believes that will 
show them to be insubstantial? The scope of cross becomes much 
broader than simply asking about specific instances that did not go 
to form the witness's opinion, but would lead to the opposite 
opinion -- which is all that FRE 608( a) permits and that this writer 
understood that Rule 5-608(a)( 4) was intended to permit. 
The Jensen majority states: 
It is fair to infer from the Rule and its history that the committee felt 
that a character witness was entitled to some latitude in informing the 
jury as to the basis for an opinion, so long as that person avoids 
venturing into the troublesome area of specific instances. Permitting 
such latitude allows the witness, within reason, to offer something to 
the jury beyond a bare conclusion that the witness "is a truthful person" 
or "is not a truthful person." Accordingly, we hold that the trial court 
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abused its discretion in restricting Goff s testimony to a description of 
her acquaintance with Wooldridge and her conclusion that he was a 
"compulsive liar." 
Id. at 708 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted). The difficult 
question is, what is that "something more"? Where is the line 
between "something more" and too much of "something more," 
i.e., "specific instances"? Judge Raker discussed the Jensen 
character witness's proffered testimony as follows: 
[She testified to] Wooldridge's tendency to tell mutually inconsistent 
stories, i.e., his general tendency to be untruthful. Nor was her 
testimony "no more than a number of specific events tied together." 
She was not testifying as to several particular instances of conduct; she 
was testifying as to a general behavior pattern which was the basis for 
her opinion that Wooldridge was untruthfuL 
Id. at 699. 
Interestingly, both Hemingway and Jensen involved 
character witnesses helpful to the accused. But if a criminal 
accused testifies and thus subjects himself or herself to unfavorable 
character witness's testimony regarding the accused's truthfulness, 
Jensen would permit the State's witness to testify to "something 
more" than opinion. And, clearly, Jensen applies to 5-608(a) 
character witnesses in civil cases. 
But what are the implications of Jensen, if any, as to Md. 
Rule 5-405? Hemingway involved a 5-405-type witness, and was 
discussed identically in the Rules Committee as to 5-405 and 5-
608. The Rules Committee's position was the same as to 5-405 as 
it was as to 5-608, but unlike Rule 5-608, Md. Rule 5-405 is 
identical, verbatim, to Federal Rule 405. If Jensen applies to Rule 
5-405, if an accused opens the door under Rule 5-404( a)(l) to 
evidence of his or her character trait pertinent to guilt or innocence, 
the direct ofthe State's character witnesses also will be broader. 
E. Text of the Referenced Rules 
RULE 5-404. CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE 
TO PROVE CONDUCT; EXCEPTIONS; OTHER CRIMES 
(a) Character Evidence Generally. 
(1) In General. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is 
not admissible for the purpose of proving action in confonnity therewith on a 
particular occasion, except: 
(A) Character of accused: Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of 
an accused offered by the accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same; 
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(B) Character of Victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of 
the victim of the crime offered by an accused or by the prosecution to rebut the 
same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by 
the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first 
aggressor; 
(C) Character of Witness. Evidence of the character of a witness with 
regard to credibility, as provided in Rules 5-607, 5-608, and 5-609. 
(2) Definitions. For purposes of subsections (a)(l )(A) and (B) of this 
Rule, "accused" means a defendant in a criminal case and a child alleged to be 
delinquent in an action in juvenile court, and for purposes of subsection 
(a)(1)(B), "crime" includes a delinquent act as defmed by Code, Courts Article, 
§ 3-80 l. 
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, 
or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show 
action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for purposes, 
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, common scheme or 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
RULE 5-405. METHODS OF PROVING CHARACTER 
(a) Reputation or Opinion. In all cases in which evidence of character or 
a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as 
to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, 
inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct. 
(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. In cases in which character or a trait 
of character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, 
proof may also be made of relevant specific instances of that person's conduct. 
RULE 5-406. HABIT; ROUTINE PRACTICE 
Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of an 
organization is relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or organization 
on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or routine practice. 
RULE 5-607. WHO MAY IMPEACH 
The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the 
party calling the witness. 
RULE 5-608. EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER OF WITNESS 
FOR TRUTHFULNESS OR UNTRUTHFULNESS 
(a) Impeachment and Rehabilitation by Character Witnesses. 
(1) Impeachment by a Character Witness. In order to attack the credibility 
of a witness, a character witness may testify (A) that the witness has a reputation 
for untruthfulness, or (B) that, in the character witness's opinion, the witness is 
an untruthful person. 
(2) Rehabilitation by a Character Witness. After the character for 
truthfulness of a witness has been attacked, a character witness may testify (A) 
that the witness has a good reputation for truthfulness or (B) that, in the 
character witness's opinion, the witness is a truthful person. 
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(3) Limitations on Character Witness's Testimony. 
(A) A character witness may not testify to an opinion as to whether a 
witness testified truthfully in the action. 
(B) On direct examination, a character witness may give a reasonable 
basis for testimony as to reputation or an opinion as to the character of the 
witness for truthfulness or untruthfulness, but may not testify to specific 
instances of truthfulness or untruthfulness by the witness. 
(4) Impeachment of a Character Witness. The court may permit a 
character witness to be cross-examined about specific instances in which a 
witness has been truthful or untruthful or about prior convictions of the witness 
as permitted by Rule 5-609. Upon objection, however, the court may permit the 
inquiry only if (A) the questioner, outside the hearing of the jury, establishes a 
reasonable factual basis for asserting that the prior instances occurred or that the 
convictions exist, and (B) the prior instances or convictions are relevant to the 
witness's reputation or to the character witness's opinion, as appropriate. 
(b) Impeachment by Examination Regarding Witness's Own Prior 
Conduct Not Resulting in Convictions. The court may permit any witness to 
be examined regarding the witness's own prior conduct that did not result in a 
conviction but that the court finds probative of a character trait of 
untruthfulness. Upon objection, however, the court may permit the inquiry only 
if the questioner, outside the hearing of the jury, establishes a reasonable factual 
basis for asserting that the conduct of the witness occurred. The conduct may 
not be proved by extrinsic evidence. 
(c) Effect on Privilege Against Self-Incrimination. The giving of 
testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does not operate as a 
waiver ofthe witness's privilege against self-incrimination when examined with 
respect to matters which relate only to credibility. 
Committee note: This Rule does not address proof of specific instances of 
conduct when offered on some theory other than impeachment by past acts 
indicative of a character trait of untruthfulness, such as evidence bearing on 
bias, interest, hostility, motive to misrepresent, or inability to observe, 
remember, or narrate. It also does not address the admissibility of evidence 
under the "opened door" theory. 
RULE 5-609. IMPEACHMENT BY EVIDENCE OF 
CONVICTION OF CRIME 
(a) Generally. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, 
evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if 
elicited from the witness or established by public record during examination of 
the witness, but only if (1) the crime was an infamous crime or other crime 
relevant to the witness's credibility and (2) the court determines that the 
probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs the danger of unfair 
prejudice to the witness or the objecting party. 
Cross reference: Code, Courts Article, § 10-905. 
Committee note: The requirement that the conviction, when offered for 
purposes of impeachment, be brought out during examination of the witness is 
for the protection of the witness. It does not apply to impeachment by evidence 
of prior conviction of a hearsay declarant who does not testify. 
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(b) Time Limit. Evidence of a conviction is not admissible under this 
Rule if a period of more than 15 years has elapsed-since the date of the 
conviction. 
(c) Other Limitations. Evidence of a conviction otherwise admissible 
under section (a) of this Rule shall be excluded if: 
(1) the conviction has been reversed or vacated; 
(2) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon; or 
(3) an appeal or application for leave to appeal from the judgment of 
conviction is pending, or the time for noting an appeal or filing an application 
for leave to appeal has not expired. 
(d) Effect of Plea of Nolo Contendere. For purposes of this Rule, 
"conviction" includes a plea of nolo contendere followed by a sentence, whether 
or not the sentence is suspended. 
Committee note: See Code, Courts Article, § 3-824 for the effect of juvenile 
adjudications and for restrictions on their admissibility as evidence generally. 
Evidence of these adjudications may be admissible under the Confrontation 
Clause to show bias; see Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). 
RULE 5-616. IMPEACHMENT AND 
REHABILIT A TION-GENERALL Y 
(a) Impeachment by Inquiry of the Witness. The credibility of a 
witness may be attacked through questions asked of the witness, including 
questions that are directed at: 
(1) Proving under Rule 5-613 that the witness has made statements that are 
inconsistent with the witness's present testimony. 
(2) Proving that the facts are not as testified to by the witness; 
(3) Proving that an opinion expressed by the witness is not held by the 
witness or is otherwise not worthy of belief; 
(4) Proving that the witness is biased, prejudiced, interested in the outcome 
of the proceeding, or has a motive to testify falsely; 
(5) Proving lack of personal knowledge or weaknesses in the capacity of 
the witness to perceive, remember, or communicate; or 
(6) Proving the character of the witness for untruthfulness by (i) 
establishing prior bad acts as permitted under Rule 5-608(b) or (ii) establishing 
prior convictions as permitted under Rule 5-609. 
(b) Extrinsic Impeaching Evidence. 
(1) Extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statements may be admitted as 
provided in Rule 5-613(b). 
(2) Other extrinsic evidence contradicting a witness's testimony ordinarily 
may be admitted only on non-collateral matters. In the court's discretion, 
however, extrinsic evidence may be admitted on collateral matters. 
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(3) Extrinsic evidence of bias, prejudice, interest, or other motive to testify 
falsely may be admitted whether or not the witness has been examined about the 
impeaching fact and has failed to admit it. 
(4) Extrinsic evidence ofa witness's lack of personal knowledge or 
weaknesses in the capacity of the witness to perceive, remember, or 
communicate may be admitted if the witness has been examined about the 
impeaching fact and has failed to admit it, or as otherwise required by the 
interests of justice. 
(5) Extrinsic evidence of the character of a witness for untruthfulness may 
be admitted as provided in Rule 5-608. 
(6) Extrinsic evidence of prior convictions may be admitted as provided by 
Rule 5-609. 
(7) Extrinsic evidence may be admitted to show that prior consistent 
statements offered under subsection (c)(2) of this Rule were not made. 
(c) Rehabilitation. A witness whose credibility has been attacked may be 
rehabilitated by: 
(1) Permitting the witness to deny or explain impeaching facts, except that 
a witness who has been impeached by prior conviction may not deny guilt of the 
earlier crime; 
(2) Except as provided by statute, evidence of the witness's prior 
statements that are consistent with the witness's present testimony, when their 
having been made detracts from the impeachment; 
(3) Evidence through other witnesses of the impeached witness's character 
for truthfulness, as provided in Rule 5-608(a); or 
(4) Other evidence that the court fmds relevant for the purpose of 
rehabilitation. 
RULE 5-806. ATT ACKlNG AND SUPPORTING 
CREDIBILITY OF DECLARANT 
(a) In General. When a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, 
the credibility of the declarant may be attacked, and if attacked may be 
supported, by any evidence which would be admissible for those purposes if the 
declarant had testified as a witness. Evidence of a statement or conduct by the 
declarant fl.t any time, inconsistent with the declarant's hearsay statement, is not 
subject to any requirement that the declarant may have been afforded an 
opportunity to deny or explain. If the party against whom a hearsay statement 
has been admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party is entitled to 
examine the declarant on the statement as if under cross-examination. 
(b) Exception. This Rule does not apply to statements by party-opponents 
under Rule 5-803(a)(1) and (a)(2). 
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